Delegated portfolio management: a survey of the theoretical literature by Stracca, Livio
WORKING PAPER SERIES
NO. 520 / SEPTEMBER 2005
DELEGATED PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT
A SURVEY OF 
THE THEORETICAL
LITERATURE
by Livio StraccaIn 2005 all ECB 
publications 
will feature 




NO. 520 / SEPTEMBER 2005
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=781088.
DELEGATED PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT






1   The views expressed in this paper are only those of the author and are not necessarily shared by the European Central
Bank.I thank Charles Goodhart for encouraging me to look at some of the issues dealt with in the paper.I also thank
three referees for several useful suggestions.
2   European Central Bank,Kaiserstrasse 29,60311 Frankfurt am Main,Germany;e-mail:livio.stracca@ecb.int © European Central Bank, 2005
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000
Telex
411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
Reproduction for educational and non-
commercial purposes is permitted provided
that the source is acknowledged.
The views expressed in this paper do not
necessarily reflect those of the European
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB
Working Paper Series is available from










2 A benchmark single-period setting 9
2.1 Some stylised facts about delegated
portfolio management 9
2.2 The standard setting 10
2.3 Functions of the compensation contract 12
3 The optimal compensation contract 14
3.1 The first best case when effort is
observable 14
3.2 Second best contracts when effort
and risk are unobservable 14
3.2.1 The irrelevance result 15
3.2.2 Linear symmetric vs. nonlinear
asymmetric contracts 18
3.2.3 Possible effects of limited liability 21
4 Multiperiod games and reputation 23
4.1 The role of reputation as an
implicit incentive 23
4.2 Reputation and excessive risk-taking 25
4.3 Reputation concerns and herding
behaviour 27




European Central Bank working paper series 38Abstract
This paper provides a selective review of the theoretical lit-
erature on delegated portfolio management as a principal-agent
relationship. The main focus of the paper is to review the analyt-
ical issues raised by the peculiar nature of the delegated portfolio
management relationship within the broader class of principal-
agent models. In particular, the paper discusses the performance
of linear vs. nonlinear compensation contracts in a single-period
setting, the possible eﬀects of limited liability of portfolio man-
agers, the role of reputational concerns in a multiperiod frame-
work, and the incentives to noise trading. In addition, the paper
deals with some general equilibrium dimensions and asset pricing
implications of delegated portfolio management. The paper also
suggests some directions for future research.
Keywords: Delegated portfolio management, agency, principal-
agent models, adverse selection, moral hazard.
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Recent decades have witnessed a sharp increase in the institutionally managed savings, both in 
absolute terms and relative to household financial wealth. As a result, institutional ownership is 
an increasingly dominant feature of developed financial markets. Delegated portfolio 
management is a complex phenomenon which encompasses different segments. The mutual fund 
industry is predominantly characterised by middle aged households investing individually in 
sometimes relatively standardised products. By contrast, pension funds are predominantly 
managed by corporate treasures, who often delegate the asset management to a third party, thus 
creating an additional layer of agency. 
 
An important stylised fact of the delegated portfolio management industry is the poor 
performance of active management compared with a passive benchmark. Thus, active 
management appears to subtract, rather than to add value. Moreover, the evidence of performance 
consistency (i.e. managers who have performed well in the past are more likely to perform well in 
the future) is mixed at best, in particular in the mutual fund industry. The difficulty in 
ascertaining future performance has led part of the industry to focus on standard products, notably 
in the pension fund industry. Part of the industry, on the other hand, has remained specialized and 
displays a high instability of market shares and a distinct lack of concentration. It is mainly for 
this segment of the industry that issues of asymmetric information between the investor and the 
manager come to the fore. In this respect, it does not really matter if the financial intermediary 
involved in portfolio management is a bank, an insurance company, and so on. What is really 
important is whether the relationship involves asymmetric information (notably moral hazard and 
adverse selection) aspects which are interesting to study. 
 
This paper offers a selective survey and an assessment of the existing theoretical literature on 
delegated portfolio management. The more general literature on asymmetric information and 
agency relationships, as reviewed for example in a textbook such as Salanie (1996), is taken as 
the starting point. The features of the typical delegated portfolio management relationship, which 
makes it essentially different from a standard agency contract traditionally studied in the earlier 
literature, are then analysed more carefully. 
 
Generally speaking, there are two main differences between a delegated portfolio management 
problem and a standard agency problem. First, the delegated portfolio management problem is 
one of information acquisition rather than of direct performance. This implies that the typical 
timing of a portfolio management problem implies some effort on the side of the agent in order to 
receive an information signal, and subsequently an (unobservable) action based on the realisation 
of the signal. Second, a portfolio manager can control the scale of the response to the signal, 
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September 2005effectively influencing both the level and the variance of the portfolio returns. In a typical agency 
problem, the agent controls either the return or the variance, but not both. 
 
A main conclusion of the literature survey is that, while this peculiar form of agency relationship 
shares many features with a traditional principal-agent model, it also presents its own challenges. 
The fact that in a delegated portfolio management setting the agent controls effort and can 
influence risk makes it more difficult for the principal to write incentive compatible contracts 
which are optimal from her standpoint. In particular, it is shown how the fact that the portfolio 
manager can control the scale of his response to the information signals in a linear (and 
potentially also nonlinear) way makes the quest for an optimal linear (and perhaps also nonlinear) 
contract for the principal very difficult. Indeed, this is a literature where negative results tend to 
prevail over constructive ones. 
 
Reputation concerns in a multi-period setting may also affect the incentives faced by portfolio 
managers and in some cases make the job of explicit incentives. At the same time, reputation 
concerns may also have distortionary effects insofar as they may lead managers to take on more 
risk or to discard private information and herd with the market, none of which necessarily goes to 
the benefit of investors. Finally, the literature has emphasised that (implicit or explicit) 
benchmarking might have significant implications for asset prices and volatilities from a general 
equilibrium standpoint.  
 
There are several directions in which this theoretical literature could be fruitfully extended. 
Delegated portfolio management often implies more than one layer of agency, especially in the 
pension fund industry: how is this likely to affect incentives and outcomes? Another interesting 
extension appears to be considering less standard utility functions for principals, say shortfall 
risk, which may be again particularly relevant in the pension fund industry. More generally, 
gaining a better understanding of the general equilibrium implications of the agency aspects of 
delegated portfolio management should be a paramount objective in future research. This is, in 
particular, a topic which should be interesting and relevant for policy-makers, given the 
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In most industrialised countries, a substantial part of ﬁnancial wealth
is not managed directly by savers, but through a ﬁnancial intermedi-
ary, which implies the existence of an agency contract between the in-
vestor (the principal) and a portfolio manager (the agent). Therefore,
delegated portfolio management is arguably one of the most important
agency relationships intervening in the economy, with a possible impact
on ﬁnancial market and economic developments at a macro level. Al-
though there are no harmonised data across countries, the general view
is that the trend towards delegated portfolio management has not been
interrupted by the increased direct accessibility to ﬁnancial markets wit-
nessed in recent years, for example through the internet. Davis and Steil
(2001) report that the share of household wealth managed by ﬁnancial
institutions has increased sharply in recent decades, in particular in the
Anglo-Saxon countris but also in Europe and Japan. The growth of
institutional assets has been particularly visible in relation to pension
funds. These developments suggest that gaining a deeper understanding
of the nature and consequences of delegated portfolio management con-
tracts is interesting and relevant, for academics and policy-makers alike
(as an indication of the interest by the latter, see for example the recent
survey by the Bank for International Settlements, 2003).
Against this background, the original contribution of this paper is to
oﬀer a selective survey and an assessment of the existing theoretical liter-
ature on delegated portfolio management. In particular, we concentrate
on the peculiar nature of delegated portfolio management as an agency
relationship. Therefore, we do not discuss — and take for granted — the
more general literature on asymmetric information and agency relation-
ships as reviewed for example by Sappington (1991) or in a textbook
such as Salanie (1996). Rather, we concentrate on the features of the
typical delegated portfolio management relationship which makes it es-
sentially diﬀerent from a standard agency contract traditionally studied
in the earlier literature, such as, for example, the classic sharecropping
model of Stiglitz (1974). Moreover, our focus is on the theoretical contri-
butions to the literature and we will touch upon the empirical literature
on portfolio delegation only occasionally.
The following key elements of a traditional agency setting provide
the essential traits against which we discuss the peculiar features of
delegated portfolio management contracts. There is a principal, say a
landlord, who wishes to delegate the management of her property to an
agent, say a tenant. The agent is better informed than the principal
before the contract is signed about its own quality (adverse selection),
or can acquire superior information (and therefore deliver a better result
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signed, which is unobservable for the principal (moral hazard). Nonethe-
less, the outcome does not depend only on the agent’s eﬀort, but also on
environmental factors outside his control. The task of the landlord is to
design a contract which encourages the best tenants to participate and,
a tt h es a m et i m e ,g i v e st h et e n a n tt h er i g h ti n c e n t i v e st ow o r kh a r dt o
achieve the result after the contract is signed.
If the agent is risk neutral, the best contract makes the agent the
residual claimant of the contract and the principal is paid a ﬂat fee by
the agent. These performance-related contracts normally ensure that
’ g o o d ’a g e n t se n t e rt h ec o n t r a c ta n dc h a r l a t a n sa r el e f to u t ,a n da tt h e
same time provides the best incentives to the agent for expending costly
eﬀort. Moreover, if the principal is risk averse, the contract is also
optimal for him from the standpoint of risk minimisation.
If, more realistically, the agent is risk averse and has no access to
credit markets on the same terms as the principal, there is an obvious
trade-oﬀ between inducing eﬀort (which requires the agent to be exposed
to the risky outcome) and providing insurance (which goes in the oppo-
site direction). For this situation, the literature has reached two main
results. First, it may be convenient for the principal to isolate the agent
from the factors on which he has no control, for example by deﬁning per-
formance in terms of diﬀerence from a benchmark catering for a common
environmental shock which aﬀects all agents indistinctly. In this way,
t h ep r i n c i p a lm a ys a v eo nt h er e m u n e r a t i o ns h eh a st op r o v i d et ot h e
agent, at the risk however of exposing himself entirely to the eﬀect of the
common shock. Second, under reasonably general assumptions, a linear
sharing rule is an optimal contract as it induces an optimal trade-oﬀ
between risk-sharing and eﬀort inducement (Holmstrom and Milgrom,
1987). Hence, the optimal contract has a linear form in which the agent
is paid a ﬂat fee plus a share of the outcome, possibly deﬁn e di nt e r m s
of a spread against a certain benchmark value. The share is optimally
set taking into account the relative risk aversion of the principal and
the agent, as well as the need to motivate the agent to undertake costly
eﬀort.
After this admittedly oversimpliﬁed description of a standard agency
setting, we set out to discuss how the basic features outlined above can
be extended to the particular form of agency relationship which is the
delegated portfolio management contract. The paper is structured as
follows. In Section 2 we present the standard framework of the problem,
a n dw et h e nd e a lw i t ht h eo p t i m a lc o m p e n s a t i o nc o n t r a c ti nas i n g l e -
period set-up in Section 3. In Section 4 we extend the discussion to
deal with a multi-period setting in which reputation concerns play an
8
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 520
September 2005important role. Some general equilibrium considerations, including the
possible impact of agency on ﬁnancial market prices and volatility, are
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 A benchmark single-period setting
2.1 Some stylised facts about delegated portfolio
management
Recent decades have witnessed a sharp increase in the institutionally
managed savings, both in absolute terms and relative to household ﬁ-
nancial wealth (Davis and Steil, 2001; BIS, 2003). As a result, institu-
tional ownership is an increasingly dominant feature of developed ﬁnan-
cial markets.
Delegated portfolio management is a complex phenomenon which
encompasses diﬀerent segments. The mutual fund industry is predomi-
nantly characterised by middle aged households investing individually in
sometimes relatively standardised products. By contrast, pension funds
are predominantly managed by corporate treasures, who often delegate
the asset management to a third party, thus creating an additional layer
of agency. As emphasised by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992b),
corporate treasures often make recourse to investment counsellors for
reasons which go beyond the optimization of asset allocation. Non-
economic factors such as hand-holding and generally direct interaction
are likely to play an important role in the pension fund industry, while
funds allocation is more based on past performance in the mutual fund
industry.
Another important stylised fact of the delegated portfolio manage-
ment industry is the poor performance of active management compared
with a passive benchmark (Malkiel, 1995; Gruber, 1996). Thus, active
management appears to subtract, rather than to add value. Moreover,
the evidence of performance consistency (i.e. managers who have per-
formed well in the past are more likely to perform well in the future)
i sm i x e da tb e s t ,i np a r t i c u l a ri nt h em u t u a lf u n di n d u s t r y( B e r ka n d
Green, 2004). The diﬃculty in ascertaining future performance has led
part of the industry to focus on standard products, notably in the pen-
sion fund industry (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992b). Part of
the industry, on the other hand, has remained specialized and displays a
high instability of market shares and a distinct lack of concentration. It
is mainly for this segment of the industry that the theoretical literature
reviewed in this paper has something interesting to say, given that non-
standardised portfolio management raises obvious issues of asymmetric
information between the investor and the manager. In this respect, it
9
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folio management is a bank, an insurance company, and so on. What is
r e a l l yi m p o r t a n ti sw h e t h e rt h er e l a t i o n s h i pi n v o l v e sa s y m m e t r i ci n f o r -
mation (notably moral hazard and adverse selection) aspects which are
interesting to study.
2.2 The standard setting
Generally speaking, there are two main diﬀerences between a delegated
portfolio management problem and a standard agency problem. First,
the delegated portfolio management problem is one of information acqui-
sition rather than of direct performance. This implies that the typical
timing of a portfolio management problem implies some eﬀort on the
side of the agent in order to receive an information signal, and subse-
quently an (unobservable) action based on the realisation of the signal.
Second, a portfolio manager can control the scale of the response to the
signal, eﬀectively inﬂuencing both the level and the variance of the port-
folio returns. In a typical agency problem, the agent controls either the
return or the variance, but not both.
The seminal contribution to the literature on delegated portfolio
management relationships is due to Bhattacharya and Pﬂeiderer (1985),
who proposed a model where a better informed agent must be solicited
to reveal superior information on the rate of return on a risky ﬁnancial
asset to the principal. Bhattacharya and Pﬂeiderer ﬁnd that a quadratic
contract penalising deviations between the ex post realisation of the re-
turn and the signal released by the agent to the principal ensures a
truthful revelation.
Bhattacharya and Pﬂeiderer’s model is one of hidden information
(security analyst framework), but the literature on delegated portfolio
management which has evolved since then often proposes model in which
there is also hidden action, i.e. an information asymmetry also after
the contract has been signed. In fact, most portfolio managers directly
manage the ﬁnancial portfolios of their clients, rather than provide them
with information which they can then use in trading directly in the
ﬁnancial market. Transaction costs and other frictions often make it
inconvenient or even impossible for clients to trade directly.
The standard delegated portfolio management problem involves a
game between an investor, the principal (henceforth P and "she") and a
portfolio manager, the agent (henceforth A or "he"). Both can be either
risk averse or risk neutral (the principal is more often assumed to be
risk neutral). The basic problem can be illustrated in a simple ﬁnancial
market where there is one risky asset and a riskless asset with rate of
return normalised to zero, with both P and A price-taker, i.e. having
10
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selection aspect of the relationship, we assume that A can be either a
’good’ agent — who can have private information about the probability
distribution of the rate of return of the risky asset — or a ’bad’ agent —
who has no access to such information. It is also normally assumed that
A has no access to insurance markets, nor can he invest in ﬁnancial assets
on his own account (for example in order to hedge its compensation).
This assumption is required to study the incentives provided to A by the
compensation contract in itself in a tractable manner, abstracting from
the complexities of optimal hedging against a stochastic performance
evaluation. This, however, does not necessarily make this assumption
very realistic.
The good type of A can learn about a signal S which is correlated
with the return on the risky asset upon expending an eﬀort e which costs
him a disutility h(e). For simplicity, we are assuming that the variable e
can take values 1 (eﬀo r ti ss p e n t )o r0 (no eﬀort). If the agent expends
eﬀort, he has therefore access to the conditional probability distribution
of the return on the risky asset.
Let the conditional return on the risky asset, y/S, be determined in
the following linear way:
y/S = µu + S + v, (1)
where v is an environmental shock which is uncorrelated with S and
e, and which has variance σ2
v,a n dµu is the unconditional mean of y
(i.e. without observing S). This speciﬁcation captures the notion that
the return on the risky asset depends on both the signal observed by A,
which is under his control, and an environmental shock, which is not.
Based on this information, A selects the weight of the risky asset in
the portfolio, αc, and consequently the rate of return on the conditional
portfolio is:
xc = αc(S)y = αc(S)(µu + S + v) (2)
For simplicity of illustration, we assume here that both P and A have
a mean-variance utility function. The optimal conditional portfolio, αc,
is then the portfolio which maximises the Sharpe ratio.
For P and for the bad type of A, S is not observablea n dt h ep r o b a -
bility distribution of y is the unconditional one:
y = µu + q, (3)
where q is a (for P and the bad A) unpredictable component.
The return on the unconditional portfolio is:
xu = αuy, (4)
11
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In the standard speciﬁcation of the game, P generally proposes the
compensation contract1,t h e nA expends eﬀort, learns the signal S (if
he is of the good type) and either reveals it to P or (more commonly)
makes the portfolio choice directly. Subsequently, the shock v is realized,
and A is paid a remuneration f(x), while the rest of the portfolio return
goes back to P.
Most models assume an asymmetric information setting in which P
cannot monitor the activities of A. While this is realistic with a view
to monitoring costs, there is nevertheless a variety of ways in which P
can gain at least a partial and imperfect monitoring of A’s activities and
this might be alleviate the costs of the agency relationship (Almazan
et al, 2004). This possibility, and the interesting trade-oﬀ which arises
between the monitoring costs and the costs related to the information
asymmetries in the agency relationship is, however, normally not ad-
dressed in the theoretical literature.
Let EUP be the expected utility of P. In this framework, by construc-
tion, the expected utility of the conditional portfolio is always higher
than that of the unconditional one:
EUP(1 + xc) >E U P(1 + xu) (5)
However, P has also to pay a stochastic fee f(x) to A in order to
accede to the conditional portfolio, and we turn to discuss the role of
this variable in the next section.
2.3 Functions of the compensation contract
Broadly speaking, a compensation function f(x) serves three main pur-
poses. First, it may have a risk-sharing function if P and A are risk
averse. Second, it will aﬀects the portfolio selection of A, including the
incentives it provides to expend eﬀort and learn about the signal S,
and therefore the distribution of returns. Third, it might send a signal
about the type of agent participating in the contract. In particular, the
compensation contract is separating if it reveals the type, and pooling
otherwise.
From a conceptual standpoint, the optimal compensation contract is
the solution to the following decision problem:
MaxfEUP(1 + x − f(x)) (6)
x = α(S)y(e) (7)
1Although there are exceptions in the literature, for example the signalling model
in Das and Sundaram (2002).
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EUAf(x) − h(e) ≥ U
∗
A (9)
EUP(1 + x − f(x)) ≥ EUP(1 + xu) (10)
Equation (6) states that the compensation contract has to be chosen
so as to maximise the expected utility of P. Equation (7) describes the
probability distribution of returns, which hinges on whether the agent
decides to put some eﬀort in obtaining the information signal S.E q u a -
t i o n( 8 )i st h ei n c e n t i v ec o m p a t i b i l i t yc o n s t r a i n t ,w h i c hs t a t e st h a te ﬀort
e and the portfolio allocation α(S) are chosen by the agent so as to max-
imise his own utility. Equation (9) is the participation constraint of the
agent, which states that the expected utility of the agent, EUA,h a st o
be at least equal to his reservation utility U∗
A.2 Finally, equation (10)
is the participation constraint of P. It should be noted that here, for
simplicity of illustration, we are assuming that P can invest in the ﬁnan-
cial market on the same terms as A, for example as regards transaction
costs. In practice, P is likely to face higher transaction costs, and this
will be reﬂe c t e di nal e v e lo fP’s reservation utility which is lower than
EUP(1 + xu).
A remuneration contract f(x) is said to be feasible if equations (7),
(8), (9) and (10) are satisﬁed. Several papers also include the additional
constraint that f(x) ≥ 0, because it is often realistic to assume that
A will not accept a negative remuneration at the end of the period
(limited liability constraint). As we will see later, the assumption of
limited liability of A has very signiﬁcant implications for the nature of
the contract and the incentives it provides.
A further important aspect to consider is the competitive situation
in the market for portfolio managers, which is of crucial importance
to determine who extracts the surplus from the agency contract. It
is somewhat more common in the theoretical literature on delegated
portfolio management to consider a situation in which there is perfect
competition among portfolio managers and all the surplus is accrued to
P as in the problem described in (6)-(10). This situation implies that
equation (9) is valid with perfect equality (A is pushed to his reservation
utility), while equation (10) is valid with inequality (P extracts the whole
information rent). Of course, also the opposite situation (all the surplus
accrues to A) is possible if there is enough competition among principals,
or an intermediate case where the surplus is split between P and A.B o t h
variants have been duly taken into consideration in the literature.
2Here we are assuming that the good and the bad agent have the same reservation
utility, which may be unrealistic. Relaxing this assumption may have important
implications on the nature of the problem, as will become apparent later on.
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3.1 The ﬁr s tb e s tc a s ew h e ne ﬀort is observable
If the eﬀort of A to acquire information is observable and there is no
information asymmetry before signing the contract, then principal and
agent act as an aggregate entity. Therefore, the optimal amount of eﬀort
is determined at the level where the aggregate marginal beneﬁtf o rb o t h
P and A is equal to the marginal cost for A. This is usually referred to
as the ﬁrst best case.
In the ﬁrst best case, the delegated portfolio management contract
is reduced to one of optimal risk sharing between P and A,i ft h e y
are risk averse (Stoughton, 1993). Under the assumption of preference
similarity and constant absolute risk aversion, the optimal payment f(x)
is a linear sharing rule (Wilson, 1968), plus a ﬁxed payment dependent
on eﬀort. In particular, the optimal sharing rule requires that each
individual receives a fraction of the return on the risky asset equal to
his risk tolerance divided by the aggregate social risk tolerance.
3.2 Second best contracts when eﬀort and risk are
unobservable
In a realistic setting, however, there is information asymmetry both
before and after signing the contract, which makes the ﬁrst best contract
unattainable.
As regards the moral hazard dimension of the problem, the agency
literature has emphasised that a linear sharing rule is no more ﬁrst best
since it leads to an underinvestment in eﬀort, due to the inability of A
to internalize the beneﬁts accruing to P from the expenditure of eﬀort.
Nonetheless, a linear contract might remain optimal in a second best
sense since it may lead to an optimal compromise between eﬀort in-
ducement and risk sharing (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; Sappington,
1991).3
The typical linear compensation contract is speciﬁed as follows:
f(x)=C + B(x − b), (11)
where C,B > 0 and b is a benchmark value, known in advance and
which can be ﬁxed or stochastic. In a standard agency setting — say
a landlord-tenant relationship — the crucial parameter is B, while C is
3In particular, the linear form of the contract can be obtained if the principal
is risk neutral or risk averse with a CARA utility function, the agent has a CARA
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value of B pushes A to expend more eﬀort, but also to take on more risk
which will increase the required ﬂat payment C.
However, the situation is substantially diﬀerent in a delegated port-
folio management contract. As we will see shortly, the linear contract
cannot be optimal in a general setting of the problem, nor can B used
to motivate the agent to expend eﬀort as in a standard agency con-
tract. More fundamentally, a compensation contract which is optimal
(from a second-best perspective) in a general class of delegated portfo-
lio management problems is not known even under the assumptions of
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). Generally speaking, the literature has
reached more negative rather than constructive results, and the search
f o ra no p t i m a lc o n t r a c th a sp r o v e dt ob ei n c o n c l u s i v ee v e ni nt h em o s t
simple settings.5
3.2.1 The irrelevance result
As noted, it is a standard conclusion of agency models that increasing
the share of output faced by A makes him work harder to the beneﬁto f
P. A main feature of the delegated portfolio management relationship is
that this basic force does not work, a conclusion known as the irrelevance
result and which is due to Stoughton (1993) and Admati and Pﬂeiderer
(1997). So, A always behaves as he was acting only on his own, and can-
not be pushed (by the compensation contract) to internalise any positive
externality from his behaviour onto the welfare of P.
Intuitively, the reason behind the irrelevance result is that in a dele-
gated portfolio management contract A h a sb o t ht h ei n c e n t i v ea n dt h e
possibility to undo the incentive eﬀect of the linear contract. In fact, as
explained in detail by Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1997), in a delegated port-
folio management setting such as the one described in Section 2 A has
complete control over the scale o fh i sr e s p o n s et ot h es i g n a l . A s s u m e
a simple agency setting where output, x, is determined by a variable
controlled by A, S, and an error term v:
4Note that the choice of b will matter in the determination of C. For example, if
b is ﬁxed in advance, the ﬂat component of the fee is, in fact, C − Bb.
5A notable exception is a recent paper by Ou-Yang (2003). Ou-Yang proposes a
continuous time model where A, the manager, decides how much to invest in bonds
and stocks and continuously adjusts his portfolio positions. The optimal contract is
derived in closed form and is found to be symmetric. The manager should be paid a
ﬁxed fee, a fraction of the total assets under management, plus a bonus or a penalty
depending upon the excess return on the portfolio compared with an appropriate
benchmark. However, in Ou-Yang’s model A has no superior information compared
with P, and trades only because of lower transaction costs. This rules out most of
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where α is a positive scalar. If the agent cannot control α,t h i si sa
standard agency problem (say, a landlord-tenant relationship) where, in
a linear contract, the parameter B can be used to motivate the agent to
work hard. However, if the agent has complete and costless control of
α, the linear compensation contract becomes:
f(x)=C + KS + Kv, (13)
where K = Bα is a real scalar completely controlled by A and which
can be varied at his choice after the realisation of the variable S.T h e r e -
fore, the variable part of the compensation depends on K (controlled by
A) and not on B (controlled by P), which consequently cannot be used
to motivate eﬀort. A key conclusion of Stoughton (1993) and Admati
and Pﬂeiderer (1997) is that a delegated portfolio management relation-
ship resembles this second type of agency problem. This implies that
linear contracts tend to lead to underinvestment of eﬀort by A,w h i c hi s
detrimental to P.
Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1997) note that this result holds irrespec-
tive of whether the contract contains a benchmark b diﬀerent from zero,
which is evident from expression (13). So, the idea that including bench-
marks in the compensation contract may motivate agents to undertake
costly eﬀort is misplaced, at least when using a linear compensation
contract and without making very restrictive assumptions. Moreover,
Admati and Pﬂeiderer also emphasise that benchmarks do not play any
useful role in risk-sharing in delegated portfolio management, since op-
timal risk-sharing should always be on the total return of the risky port-
folio, not on the return relative to a benchmark. As regards the possible
advantage often mentioned in the agency literature that benchmarks can
serve as screening devices in order to keep bad agents away from sign-
ing the contract (adverse selection), a benchmark b is certainly not an
optimal way to assess performance, unless the benchmark is the optimal
conditional portfolio.6 Overall, Admati and Pﬂeiderer conclude that the
benchmark (unless it is the optimal conditional portfolio, which is gen-
erally not accessible to P) is a distorting factor and should at best be
ignored in a delegated portfolio management contract.
A conclusion of this analysis is that moral hazard appears to be
an important reason speaking for a recourse to non-linear contracts in
6Moreover, in a linear contract the ﬂat fee parameter C can be used to keep bad
agents away from the contract as well as, if not better than, measuring performance
in terms of the spread of x with a benchmark b.
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cannot be used to motivate the agent due to his ability to undo its
incentive structure by varying the scale of the response to the signal in
a linear way.7
For example, a quadratic contract can take the following form:
f(x)=C + B(x − b)
2 (14)
Based on the idea that a quadratic contract might succeed where the
linear contract fails, Stoughton (1993) has shown that, in a security an-
alyst framework (where P trades for herself in a direct revelation mecha-
nism conditional on the report of a signal by A), the quadratic contract
of Bhattacharya and Pﬂeiderer (1985) (where B<0) is able to elicit
truthful elicitation of the signal observed by A. Moreover, Stoughton
ﬁnds that a higher B (in absolute value) does provide the agent with
incentives to undertake eﬀort. In addition, the quadratic contract is able
to reach the ﬁrst best if P is risk neutral (in fact, the quadratic contract
is not optimal from a risk sharing perspective, but this is not important
for a risk neutral P).
It should be emphasised that, apart from the quite restrictive as-
sumption that P trades on herself (which is not very realistic in today’s
ﬁnancial markets), Stoughton’s quadratic contract does not solve the ir-
relevance problem if A is allowed to respond in a nonlinear way to the
signal. More generally, it is doubtful that nonlinear contracts may solve
the irrelevance problem highlighted by Stoughton (1993) and Admati
and Pﬂeiderer (1997) unless there are restrictions imposed on A’s trad-
ing set. Consider, in fact, a nonlinear compensation scheme f(x) and
the simple agency problem described above, where A has a complete and
costless control of a nonlinear reaction function to the signal S, g(S+v).
We obtain:
f(x)=f(g(S + v)) (15)
It is immediate to conclude that if g = f−1 is within the trading
possibilities of A, the irrelevance result still holds. So, A’s incentives to
7It is important to note, however, that the irrelevance result is weakened once we
allow for short-selling bounds on α. Notably, Gomez and Sharma (2003) ﬁnd that
linear performance-adjusted contracts do provide managers with good incentives for
gathering better information. This is quite intuitive since bounds on α do not allow
A to fully undo the incentive structure of the linear contract by setting α = K
B (see
eq. (13)) for any signal S received. Moreover, Gomez and Sharma ﬁnd that with
short-selling bounds A’s share in the portfolio return is higher than the ﬁrst best
and decreases as the leverage constraint is relaxed. In addition, Ozerturk (2004) has
shown that if A is a large trader who has an impact on asset prices, linear contracts
do give A the incentives to expend costly eﬀort. The irrelevance result only holds
when A is completely price-taker in the ﬁnancial market.
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consideration of the positive externality on P’s utility.8
3.2.2 Linear symmetric vs. nonlinear asymmetric contracts
In the absence of a generally accepted optimal compensation contract
valid in all settings, some contributions in the literature have investigated
the property of speciﬁc contracts, normally without making any claim
of general optimality. An important issue dealt with in the literature
is whether the compensation contract should be symmetric (penalising
negative outcomes in the same way as it rewards good outcomes) or
asymmetric and convex (i.e., where the marginal reward is higher, the
better the performance compared with a benchmark). In this respect, it
should be recalled that in the United States the SEC prohibits asymmet-
ric and nonlinear compensation contracts in the mutual fund industry,
i.e. contracts which are not linear and symmetric around a prespeciﬁed
benchmark, although recent changes in the regulation have weakened
the prohibition to some extent.
Starks (1987) is an important paper in this respect as it analyses the
relative desirability of a symmetric, fulcrum performance fee compared
with an asymmetric bonus contract. The main ﬁnding of the analysis
is that the symmetric performance fee is to be preferred to the bonus
contract because it can at least align A’s attitude towards risk to that of
P (although, as we have seen, it does not solve all the agency problems
in a delegated portfolio management relationship).
As noted by Garcia (2001), symmetric linear contracts or, more fre-
quently, contracts with no explicit performance-related compensation
are typical of the (regulated) mutual fund industry, while in the (unreg-
ulated) hedge fund industry call-option type contracts are widespread
(Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross, 1998). Call-option compensation con-
tracts are also popular in corporate ﬁnance mainly because they are
thought to make managers (e.g., CEOs) less conservative, which should
ultimately beneﬁt shareholders. On the other hand, it is generally not
8This possibility is indeed hinted at in the conclusions of Stoughton’s (1993) pa-
per, also suggesting that limiting the recourse of portfolio managers to complex and
nonlinear ﬁnancial products such as derivatives might be desirable from an agency
standpoint. Dybig, Farnsworth and Carpenter (2004) and Almazan et al (2004) also
justify the recourse to contraints on A’s trades as part of the portfolio delegation
contract on similar grounds. Interestingly, a study of the Bank for International
Settlements (2003) reports an increased use of constraints on investment, such as
limits on investing in speciﬁc securities, in the mutual fund industry (though Al-
mazan et al report the opposite conclusion). The real question, however, is whether
such constraints are enforceable in practice.
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A call-option compensation contract has the following expression:
f(x)={
C + B(x − b) if x ≥ b
0, if x<b (16)
In fact, the conviction that option-like contracts make agents more
risk-loving is only partially founded, as discussed by Chen and Pennacchi
(2002) and Ross (2004). Indeed, without further conditions on utility
functions of A, it is not correct to conclude that giving options to man-
agers makes them more risk-loving (and more willing to work hard). The
overall eﬀect of the compensation scheme has to be evaluated taking into
account both the utility function UA as well the functional form of the
compensation contract, so the derived utility of the agent UA(f(x)).S o ,
a convex compensation scheme does not necessarily convexify A’s utility
function, nor a concave compensation schedule necessarily concavify it
and makes A more risk averse.
Ross (2004) demonstrates that there are indeed two additional eﬀects
to consider beyond the fact that the compensation schedule is convex
(convexity eﬀect). First, the translation eﬀect shifts the evaluation of
a n yr i s k yb e tt oad i ﬀerent portion of the domain of the utility func-
tion. In practice, if A has an increasing absolute risk aversion, he might
behave in a more risk-averse manner the more asymmetric the compen-
sation contract is compared with his initial level of wealth. This happens
because with a call-option compensation A evaluates the lottery in a por-
t i o no ft h ed o m a i no ft h eu t i l i t yf u n c t i o nw h e r eh ei sm o r er i s ka v e r s e .
Second, the magniﬁcation eﬀect, which depends on the size of the pa-
rameter B, raises the risk of the gamble for A and therefore lowers his
willingness to take it on.10 A consequence of this analysis is that also
in a delegated portfolio management context it is not a foregone conclu-
sion that granting the portfolio manager a call option should increase
his willingness to bear risks.
Carpenter (2000) proposes a model providing a rigorous description
of the optimal investment choice of a risk averse manager who is com-
pensated with a call-option contract such as that in (16). On the one
9Garcia (2001) attempts at providing a theoretical justiﬁcation of the optimality of
call-option contracts, showing that they may be an optimal way (at least among linear
contracts) to let fund managers with low prospects get a ﬁxed wage, and managers
with high prospects get a contingent compensation. Garcia’s model crucially depend
on the assumption that A’s participation constraint has to be satisﬁed ex post and
not only ex ante.
10Ross (2004) shows that even for a manager with a CARA utility function (for
which there is obviously no translation eﬀect) the magniﬁcation eﬀect alone is able
to oﬀset the convexity eﬀect.
known (even in a general principal-agent setting) whether there are sit-
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portfolio returns that are very away from the money (the manager ei-
ther signiﬁcantly outperforms the benchmark or incurs in severe losses),
which increases return variance. This tendency is aggravated for options
which are deep out of the money. On the other hand, A moderates the
return variance if the value of the asset portfolio is large enough in order
to lock in his gains, owing to his risk aversion. An interesting result —
also in the light of the subsequent analysis of Ross (2004) — is that an
option-like compensation contract might under certain conditions lead
A to choose a level of return volatility which is below the one he would
choose when trading on his own. In the terminology of Ross (2004), this
result appears to be related to the magniﬁcation eﬀe c ti m p l i c i ti nt h e
leverage of the option contract. Overall, Carpenter concludes that the
eﬀects of an option-like compensation on the manager attitude towards
risk are more complex than simple intuition might suggest.
Das and Sundaram (2002) explicitly compare the symmetric con-
tracts dictated by the SEC (’fulcrum’ contracts) with an asymmetric,
convex one (’incentive’ contract). In a signalling model including a good
(informed) and a bad (uninformed) A, Das and Sundaram ﬁnd that,
quite intuitively, incentive fees lead to the adoption of more risky port-
folios than fulcrum fees. So, fulcrum fees provide a better risk-sharing
than incentive fees, and reduce A’s incentive to choose overly risky port-
folios. However, they also ﬁnd that equilibrium investor welfare may be
strictly higher under incentive fees than fulcrum fees if the ’bad’ (un-
informed) agent has a reservation utility (U∗
A) which is low enough. In
fact, an asymmetric contract may lure uninformed agents in the business
of delegated portfolio management who would otherwise stay out of the
market were the fees of the symmetric type. Because fulcrum fees make
it easier for the good type of A to separate himself from the bad one,
they make mimicking by the uninformed agent more expensive. To the
extent that a pooling contract is desirable for P and that the reservation
utility of the good agent is high enough, it may be preferable to oﬀer
a contract which makes separation less easy for good agents and the
i n c e n t i v ec o n t r a c ti sp r e f e r a b l et ot h ef u l c r u mc o n t r a c ti nt h i sr e s p e c t .
Clearly, however, in a competitive market for portfolio managers
where the reservation utility of the good A is pushed to zero and all
the surplus is accrued to P, there is no need to make separation less
easy for good agents, and there is consequently no reason to consider
incentive fees, which are strictly dominated by fulcrum fees.
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An asymmetric and convex nature of the compensation contract may
also arise not as an explicit and built-in feature of the contractual rela-
tionship, but rather as a de facto consequence of limited liability of A.
This is very realistic in a delegated portfolio management setting, where
for example the manager can sabotage the portfolio ex post (Palomino
and Prat, 2003). Under limited liability of A, a linear symmetric contract
can de facto become an option contract like the one in (16).
This possibility has attracted some attention in the literature due to
its empirical plausibility. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) have showed in a
general agency context that if there is limited liability, the agent has an
incentive to take on a riskier portfolio than otherwise (see also Gollier,
Koehl and Rochet, 1997). Hence, the relevant question is whether, due to
limited liability, A has an incentive to take on too much risk, and whether
P can do anything (in the structure of the compensation contract that
he proposes) to oﬀset this incentive, especially if P is risk averse. It
should be emphasised, however, that what it is claimed here is that A
is more risk-loving under limited liability than otherwise, not that he is
risk-loving in general or that he necessarily takes on more risk than it
is desirable for P (see the discussion in the previous section on convex
compensation schemes).
Rajan and Srivastava (2000) demonstrate that if A’s utility function
is unbounded (for example, A is risk neutral), the compensation function
must be bounded, otherwise A w o u l dp r e f e rt ot a k ea ni n ﬁnite amount
of risk, and the delegated portfolio management problem would have no
solution. Therefore, a linear contract is fundamentally incompatible with
limited liability. The alternative considered by Rajan and Srivastava is
the bonus contract,w h e r e b y :
f(x)=C, if x ≥ b, (17)
and zero if x ≤ b,w h e r eb is a benchmark which plays the role
of a threshold level. Assume that portfolio allocation takes place in
a stochastic context where a number of potential states of the world
lead to diﬀerent portfolio returns. Rajan and Srivastava prove that the
optimal portfolio choice by A consists of a short position in one state
of nature and a long position in all other states (which they label the
’bang-bang’ portfolio). P is able to inﬂuence the level of risk through
the choice of the threshold b, subject to A’s participation constraint.
In this context, a main result of Rajan and Srivastava is that ﬁnancial
innovation — which allows A to take even more aggressive gambles by
enlarging the menu of available assets — may be detrimental to P as it
induces excessive risk-taking by A for any given threshold b.
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is no optimal linear contract. Therefore, they analyse the bonus contract
and model the interaction between a risk-neutral P and a risk-neutral A.
They ﬁnd that, under certain assumptions, the set of optimal contracts
contains a bonus contract.11 The threshold b a b o v ew h i c ht h ea g e n t
receives the bonus is determined as a compromise between the need not
to induce a too high risk level (which calls for a lower b)a n dt h en e e dt o
reduce the rents for A by making his job too easy (which calls for a higher
b) .P a l o m i n oa n dP r a tc o n c l u d et h a ti fi ti sc h e a pf o rA to play with risk
(e.g. high-powered ﬁnancial instruments are available) we should expect
a low threshold b a n da ni n e ﬃciently conservative behaviour by A.
Another element which can be induced by A’s limited liability in a
delegated portfolio management setting and which has attracted some
attention in the literature is churning or noise trading,i . e . t r a d i n gi n
the ﬁnancial market without any particular reason (such as superior
information or hedging motives) for doing so. The seminal paper on this
topic is Allen and Gorton (1993), who assume a competitive industry for
managers where good managers are in short supply and bad managers
are around. Because of limited liability, agents are (de facto) paid with a
call option which attracts charlatans and induces risk-loving behaviour
by them. So, these agents just churn in the market even though they
lose on average to the good managers. As a result of this behaviour and
under certain assumptions, the agency contract may create ’churning
bubbles’ and mispricing.
In contrast with Allen and Gorton (1993) where the bad agents churn,
Dow and Gorton (1997) present a model where churning is consequence
of the actions by the good agents. In a moral hazard context, because of
asymmetric information, P cannot distinguish ’actively doing nothing’
by A (managers do not trade because no mis-priced security is available)
from ’simply doing nothing’ (managers do not look for mis-priced secu-
rities and just sit idle). In a context in which this makes it impossible
to reward inactivity and if limited liability prevents punishing ex post
incorrect decisions, the contract may induce the good portfolio manager
to churn.12 In particular, good managers churn because this may be a
11It should be noted that a bonus contract would not be optimal (even under the
assumptions set out by Palomino and Prat) if at least one of the two parties were
not risk neutral. In fact, a bonus contract does not provide an optimal risk sharing,
and with an insurance motive the optimal contract will tend to be smoother than
the bonus contract.
12Theoretically, a contract involving a large bonus for taking correct trading de-
cisions (such as that proposed by Palomino and Prat, 2003) and a small lump-sum
payment for inactivity (which, if suﬃciently large, would encourage good agents to
work and bad agents to stay away from the contract) would solve the problem. Dow
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g i v e nt h a ti ti sd i ﬃcult to distinguish talent and eﬀo r tj u s ti nt h ep o r t -
folio return, especially at relatively short evaluation horizons such those
which prevail in the mutual fund industry. Dow and Gorton also stress
that for P n o i s et r a d i n gl o w e r st h ee x p e c t e dr a t eo fr e t u r no nt h ep o r t -
folio. On the other hand, churning may beneﬁt hedgers and therefore
reduce the cost of hedging, which may have a beneﬁcial impact on the
functioning of the market as a whole by increasing its liquidity.
4 Multiperiod games and reputation
4.1 The role of reputation as an implicit incentive
There is an adage in the mutual fund industry that "the real business
of money management is not managing money, it is getting money to
manage". The underlying idea is that new money is expected to ﬂow
into the fund if the manager has performed well relative to a certain
point of reference (such as the average performance of his competitors).
Since compensation contracts usually include a fee which is a share on
the assets managed, this creates an implicit incentive for managers to
perform well which adds to the explicit incentives set out in the compen-
sation contract.13 In the real world, delegated portfolio management is a
fundamentally multi-period game even if the vast majority of contracts
have a relatively short horizon (Goldman and Sleazak, 2003). In this
situation, career concerns of portfolio managers related to the willing-
ness to attract new funds in the future may motivate them to undertake
costly eﬀort, which creates information rents for the principals in the
same way as explicit performance-based compensation. More in gen-
eral, reputation may have a signiﬁcant impact on the incentives faced
by agents in a delegated portfolio management setting.
In this respect, it is striking to note that there appears to be little ex-
plicit relation between fees and performance in the mutual fund industry
(Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992a; Bank for International Settle-
ments, 2003). In fact, most contracts do not even have a performance-
based fees component, and the compensation is simply a ﬁxed fraction of
the assets managed (Heinkel and Stoughton, 1994).14 This phenomenon
and Gorton assume that this compensation contract is not available or not feasible.
See Bhattacharya (1999) for a criticism of the assumptions of Dow and Gorton and
of the conclusion that churning is an unavoidable consequence of limited liability.
13The idea of implicit incentives in the principal-agent literature is well known at
least since Fama (1980).
14However, the unit fee is normally a concave function of assets managed, which
might be related to the existence of ﬁxed costs for managers. Moreover, Christoﬀersen
(2001) document that fund managers often voluntarily waive their ﬁxed fees in order
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contract in a single-period delegated portfolio management setting, as
discussed extensively in the previous section. So, implicit rather than
explicit incentives appear to matter in practice. This has led to some
attention in the literature on the possible alternative incentives provided
by reputation concerns.
In addition, several papers have pointed to the fact that there seems
to be a fundamental asymmetry in the payoﬀs related to reputation
concerns. Sirri and Tufano (1998), among others, have reported that
net investment ﬂows are much less sensitive to past returns when these
are bad, and more sensitive when these are good, leading to an implicit
asymmetric compensation pattern. Lynch and Musto (2003) provide
a rationale for that pattern, by pointing to the possibility that funds
respond to bad — but not good — performance by replacing the personnel
or techniques that produced it. Therefore, a good outcome for returns
may be more informative for the future performance of a certain portfolio
manager than a bad outcome.
To rationalise the recourse to implicit, rather than explicit incentives
by investors, Heinkel and Stoughton (1994) analyse the incentives for
managers in a two-period model in which managers are compared to a
sample of other managers, and retained only if their performance is good
enough. The retention decision is assumed to be taken by the investor at
the end of the ﬁrst period. In their model, investors (P) cannot observe
neither A’s quality (adverse selection), nor his eﬀort level (moral haz-
ard). Heinkel and Stoughton’s main ﬁnding is that the contract taken in
the early stages of a client-manager relationship is not fully separating
and has a weak performance-based component. This is in striking dif-
ference from the performance-based, single-period contracts which has
been discussed in the literature (but which does not seem to be very
popular in the industry).
Importantly, in Heinkel and Stoughton’s paper P’s interests are best
served by providing incentives through a threat of dismissal following a
performance evaluation, rather than with a large performance-based fee
component in the ﬁrst-period contract. This contract creates an implicit
incentive for managers to perform well compared with their peers. By
contrast, the second-period contract (conditional on the retention de-
cision) has a strong performance-based fee as in any single-period con-
tract.15 Other papers (e.g., Farnsworth, 2003) emphasise the stronger
to improve their performance and thereby their reputation (which is important in
order to get assets to manage in the future). This practice may make ﬁxed fees more
performance-related, albeit in a way which is not controlled by the investors.
15It should be noted, however, that Heinkel and Stoughton’s two period contract
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reputation models, reputation eﬀects are important in the ﬁrst period
but die out when reputation becomes very good. In this later stage,
explicit incentives must be provided substituting for the incentives pre-
viously provided by reputation concerns. It should be noted that these
models, however, abstract from the transition costs of switching man-
agers after the single period performance tests, which are likely to matter
considerably in the real world.
With the above as background, two sets of issues have been dealt
with extensively in the literature. The ﬁrst is whether the asymmetry of
implicit incentives might be the trigger of possible excessive risk-taking
by portfolio managers. Suppose, in fact, that remuneration is given sim-
ply by a ﬁxed fraction of the total assets under management. In this
setting, there is clearly a situation of limited liability which generally
encourages agents to take on more risk, as we have seen in the previous
section. The second issue is whether the fact of competing with other
managers might encourage portfolio managers to discard private infor-
mation and herd with the market, depending on the precise incentive
structures related to reputation and managers’ degree of risk aversion.
In other words, reputation concerns may lead A to lean towards either
anti-herding or pro-herding behaviour, depending on his utility function
and the payoﬀ structure, and these are tendencies which do not nec-
essarily beneﬁt P or the overall eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial market. We
consider the ﬁrst possibility in Section 4.2, and the second one in Section
4.3.
4.2 Reputation and excessive risk-taking
With a focus on the eﬀects of reputation concerns on risk-taking, Hu-
berman and Kandel (1993) present an adverse selection model where a
manager’s objective is the sum of the expected utility of the investment
immediate outcome and a reward entailed by the market’s inference re-
garding his ability. The amount of wealth A manages and the fees he
receives for it depend on his reputation. Huberman and Kandel ﬁnd
that the portfolio weights may be used to signal the managers’ ability,
is optimal under the assumption that, once A has been revealed to be of the good
type, he gains all the bargaining power in the relationship (and all information rents).
This is the fundamental reason why implicit incentives succeed (in the ﬁrst period)
where explicit incentives fail from the standpoint of P. The only way for P to gain a
surplus is to make the more able type of A face a signiﬁcant risk of not being retained
at the time of the performance evaluation. For this reason, the pooling contract in
the ﬁrst period works to the mutual beneﬁto fb o t ht h ei n f o r m e dA and P.O nt h e
other hand, a multi-period model with increased competition among managers will
become similar to a single-period model.
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high quality managers. In particular, under a certain parameter con-
ﬁguration, if only few bad managers are present in the population, a
pooling equilibrium may arise, which entails exaggerated investment of
both types of managers. Under an alternative parameter conﬁguration,
only the better type exaggerates his position in the risky asset compared
with the optimal level, in order to deter the bad manager from imitating
it (separating equilibrium). In either case, reputation concerns lead to
an over-investment in the risky asset.
In the same vein, Huddart (1999) also proposes a adverse selection,
two-period model. Huddart emphasises that when asset fees are a frac-
tion of assets under management, managers will have incentives to dis-
tort their asset allocation in order to appear to be informed at the end
of the ﬁrst period, which leads to a suboptimal situation for P.I np a r -
ticular when the barriers to entry are low, uninformed managers enter in
the relationship and are willing to take on high risks in order to produce
a track record which suggests possession of superior information (which
in reality they do not have). A main conclusion of the analysis is that
the variance of fund returns are higher in the presence of a reputation
eﬀect than in a single-period setting with no reputation, and this hold
both in a pooling and in a separating equilibrium.
However, Huddart also ﬁn d st h a te x p l i c i tpe r f o r m a n c ef e e s( e . g . ,s y m -
metric and linear) mitigate such excess risk-taking by A, irrespective of
whether he is good or bad. In fact, a performance fee may in part undo
the eﬀects of reputation, even when Stoughton (1993)’s irrelevance re-
sult holds as regards information acquisition eﬀort. Since A is risk averse
in Huddart’s model, the possible reward in terms of getting additional
funds to manage in the future if his future reputation is good has to be
weighted against the cost of taking on a risky bet today. A performance
fee provides exactly that risk to A, which then mitigates his risk-taking
behaviour.
Several contributions in the literature have emphasised the risk-taking
behaviour of mutual funds in a tournament setting, i.e. depending on
their interim performance in the middle of the year compared with their
peers (given that relative performance is normally calculated over the
calendar year). In a situation where the amount of remuneration that a
fund receives for winning a tournament depends upon its performance
relative to other participants, theory (Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro, 2003)
and empirical evidence (Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996; Chevalier and
Ellison, 1997) tend to suggest that funds which trail the benchmark
at mid-year will subsequently take on more risk (and gamble for resur-
rection), while funds which are ahead of the competition will become
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behaviour of portfolio managers is rational if it is due to an asymmetric
structure of incentives whereby a good performance is rewarded more
than a bad performance is penalised. This appears to be particularly
true for young portfolio managers, for whom reputation concerns matter
most (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999).
As shown by Chen and Pennacchi (2002), however, portfolio man-
agers do not really have any incentive to increase the overall volatility
of their portfolios in a tournament setting, but only the variance of the
tracking error, i.e. the departure of their portfolios from the bench-
mark portfolio. In fact, Chen and Pennacchi show that a worsening
performance (which, under certain assumptions, leads A to gamble for
resurrection, as we have seen) might actually move the portfolio closer
to the one which minimises absolute return variance.
In addition, ranking concerns may exacerbate the possible distortion
of reputation concerns in inducing excessive risk-taking, as emphasised
by Goriaev, Palomino and Prat (2001). In a two-period model with two
risk-neutral competing fund managers with ranking objectives, these
authors show (and ﬁnd empirical conﬁrmation that) a good (top decile)
interim performance generates strong incentives to take on more, rather
than less, risks in order to end the year ranked ﬁrst. So, if performance
is deﬁned in terms of ranking and if this creates a "winner takes all"
situation, the mutual funds with the highest chance of being the interim
winner, and not the interim losers, will take on the most risk.
4.3 Reputation concerns and herding behaviour
Another possible dimension of the tournament aspect of the delegated
portfolio management problem related to reputation concerns is the pos-
sibility that mutual funds tend to discard private information and herd,
as suggested by Scharfstein and Stein (1990). This tendency, in par-
ticular, might be related to two aspects of the typical delegated port-
folio management relationship. First, most contracts have a relatively
short evaluation period, such as one year, and can be terminated at a
very short notice (Goldman and Sleazak, 2003). Therefore, mutual fund
managers cannot aﬀord to wait until their private information (even if
eventually correct) is revealed and incorporated in asset prices (Froot,
Scharfstein and Stein, 1992). Second, performance is evaluated against
an implicit benchmark often given by the average peer performance.
In this situation and abstracting from the possible asymmetry of the
compensation structure and risk-taking which we have discussed in the
previous section, risk-averse portfolio managers will tend to stick to the
portfolio allocation decisions of the herd in order to minimise the per-
formance risk.16
16This point is, of course, well known also in a broader agency theory setting; see,
in particular, the discussion on corporate conservatism in Zwiebel (1995).
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cially emphasised by Goldman and Sleazak (2003), who consider a se-
quence of managers, where each subsequent manager inherits the portfo-
lio of their predecessor. A key assumption of the model is that the tenure
of managers is shorter than the investment horizons of the principals.
Managers are, quite realistically, assumed to be remunerated according
to the change in the value of the portfolio (compared with the portfo-
lio they inherited). A main conclusion of the model by Goldman and
Sleazak is that the inherited portfolio distorts the subsequent manager’s
incentive to trade on long-term information, and this allows erroneous
information and mispricing to persist. So, the inherited position may
create a ’lock-in’ eﬀect. For example, if a manager inherits a long posi-
tion from his predecessor, in an agency context and with a short time
horizon his incentives are tilted against selling the asset even when he
has negative private information on it.
On the latter point related to implicit benchmarks, Maug and Naik
(1996) note that contracts for delegated portfolio management always
contain relative performance elements. They show that this relative
element biases managers to deviate from return-maximising portfolio al-
locations and follow those of their benchmark (herding). In their model,
the smart manager mimics the dumb and neglects private information,
possibly also implying underinvestment in the eﬀort necessary to acquire
that information. Thus, although a relative compensation structure is
not necessarily suboptimal from the point of view of P because it allows
her to insulate A from the market risk, therefore being able to hire him
cheaper, it may ultimately lead to a situation where each fund managers
may decide to acquire the same information and the same assets as their
peers, even if these decisions do not maximise risk adjusted expected
returns. In this vein, Arora and Ou-Yang (2001b) present a two-period
continuous-time model where a risk-averse manager wishes to track the
benchmark against which he is being measured because he is risk averse.
Arora and Ou-Yang develop a dynamic principal-agent model which fo-
cuses on the interplay between implicit incentives (given by reputation
concerns) and explicit incentives (given by the compensation contract).
In this model, the optimal portfolio policy suggests some herding behav-
iour. Arora and Ou-Yang (2001b) also conclude that the manager tends
to follow the benchmark portfolio more closely in the earlier stage of the
career, when reputation is more important, than later when he grows
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folio management
The literature reviewed thus far has focused only, or at least mainly, on
a partial equilibrium setting represented by a game between an investor
and a portfolio manager, taking asset prices and returns as given. But
there is also an interesting and important aspect of delegated portfolio
m a n a g e m e n tw h i c hh a st od ow i t ht h ei m p a c tt h a tt h i st y p eo fa g e n c y
relationship may have on asset prices and volatilities from a general equi-
librium standpoint. In fact, the type of compensation contract chosen
by each investor and manager, only with a view to maximising his/her
own welfare, can clearly have repercussions on the equilibrium at the
aggregate level. Although this aspect is quite underdeveloped in the
literature, there have been a few papers which have explicitly looked at
the general equilibrium dimension of delegated portfolio management.
Most of these papers have concentrated on a particular feature of del-
egated portfolio management contracts, i.e. the presence of an explicit
or implicit benchmark in the incentive structure of portfolio managers
which stems from the agency relationship.
An important paper in this direction is Roll (1992), who showed
that when performance is deﬁned in terms of an exogenous benchmark
and if the benchmark portfolio is not mean-variance eﬃcient (which is
highly plausible in practice), the portfolio choice by A consistent with a
benchmark-adjusted compensation structure will not be mean-variance
eﬃcient. Drawing on this idea, Brennan (1993) analysed the market
equilibrium implications of portfolios managed on an agency basis. The
main ﬁnding of the simple analysis by Brennan is that if the benchmark
portfolio is chosen exogenously (e.g., the Standard and Poor 500), equi-
librium expected returns are a linear function of covariances (or betas)
with respect to the residual portfolio of the assets not contained in the
aggregate benchmark portfolio.17 As a result, only t h ec o v a r i a n c ew i t h
the residual portfolio is priced in the model. Unless principals know
the structure of expected returns and choose the benchmark portfolio
optimally, equilibrium expected returns will not be eﬃcient.
A more developed analysis of the general equilibrium implications of
delegated portfolio management as an agency relationship is Cuoco and
Kaniel (2001), who study an economy where a fraction of investors del-
egate their investment decisions to fund managers. The fund managers’
compensation is assumed to include (with no claim that this is an opti-
17See also Stutzer (2003).
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of the managed assets, and a performance fee which depends on the
spread between the return on the managed portfolio and a benchmark
portfolio. Cuoco and Kaniel study the general equilibrium implications
of two types of performance-based components, namely a fulcrum fee
and an asymmetric fee where good performance is more important than
bad performance. Importantly, Cuoco and Kaniel only consider explicit
incentives and do not deal with the kind of (possibly asymmetric) im-
plicit incentives provided by reputation concerns, as discussed in Section
4.
As regards the symmetric performance contract, Cuoco and Kaniel
ﬁnd that individual risk-averse managers ceteris paribus prefer to over-
invest in stocks included in the benchmark portfolio and under-invest in
stocks excluded from it. At a macro level, this leads to higher equilib-
rium prices and Sharpe ratios of the stocks in the benchmark portfolio,
which is also consistent with the available empirical evidence (for ex-
ample, stocks included in the Standard and Poor 500, the most widely
used benchmark portfolio, tend to experience an increase in price). With
asymmetric performance fees, the situation is more complex since, on the
one hand, risk averse agents want to hold assets having a high correlation
with the benchmark in order to minimise the variance of their compensa-
tion, but, on the other hand, they may also want a low correlation with
the index to maximize the expected return of the performance fee which
is, by assumption, a convex function of the excess return. In fact, either
incentive can dominate and, in general, with asymmetric performance
fees diﬀerentials in prices and Sharpe ratios tend to be smaller than with
fulcrum fees.
Gomez and Zapatero (2003) consider a ﬁnancial market with two
types of investors, absolute (caring for absolute returns) and benchmark
(caring for returns relative to a benchmark). Portfolio managers are
evaluated with respect to a given, exogenous benchmark portfolio. Based
on this set-up, Gomez and Zapatero derive a two-factor CAPM model
where the equilibrium relationship between expected excess returns and
covariance with both the market portfolio (absolute) and the diﬀerence
between the market and benchmark portfolios (benchmark) matters. In
line with Brennan (1993), their empirical evidence also suggests that,
especially in the more recent period, the benchmark risk appears to be
priced in the market.
In contrast with the previous papers (which overall tend to stress
that agency and dependency on a benchmark leads to a bias in equilib-
rium asset prices), Kapur and Timmerman (2003) have a more benign
interpretation of the role of the delegated portfolio management agency
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man propose a model where, by assumption, managerial remuneration
is linked in a linear way (which, as seen, is not necessarily optimal) to
t h ef u n d ’ sa b s o l u t ep e r f o r m a n c ea sw e l la st oi t sp e r f o r m a n c er e l a t i v e
to rival funds. A main conclusion of the analysis is that delegated port-
folio management is likely to lead to a larger demand for risky assets
than if investors invested directly, for essentially two reasons. First, the
compensation contract leads to risk sharing between P and A,s oe a c ho f
them is individually willing to take on more risk. Second, fund managers
may be better informed than direct investors, and so their information
advantage indirectly lowers the risk of investing in risk-bearing assets
also for investors. The overall result of a more widespread recourse to
delegated portfolio management might be a lower required equity pre-
mium, which is broadly consistent with the recent empirical evidence.
Finally, an important paper stressing the general equilibrium dimen-
sions of delegated portfolio management is Berk and Green (2004). The
starting point of this article is the empirical evidence reported by a large
number of studies (as already touched upon in Section 2) suggesting
that, ﬁrst, mutual fund managers do not appear to outperform passive
benchmarks (at least beyond very short horizons), and, second, that the
relative performance of fund managers at a certain point in time is found
not to be predicted by past relative performance. Prima facie,t h i se v i -
dence would be inconsistent with a lot of what the theoretical literature
has been based on, such as the idea that A has superior information
and has to be compensated in order to reveal or use it. Berk and Green
argue, however, that this empirical evidence is easily explained once one
takes into account the general equilibrium dimension of delegated port-
folio management. Berk and Green’s model is one in which managers
do have superior and diﬀerential ability to generate information about
future asset returns, but there are decreasing returns to scale in doing
that. Managed assets ﬂow towards managers which have had superior
performance, and principals learns rationally about managers’ abilities.
In equilibrium, and assuming perfect competition among principals for
these abilities, all principals earn zero extra proﬁts, which exactly ex-
plains the empirical evidence just mentioned.18
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have selectively reviewed the theoretical literature deal-
ing with the analytical issues arising from delegated portfolio manage-
18On the other hand, this conclusion would still invalidate a good part of the
delegated portfolio management literature which is based on the idea that principals
can extract a surplus from the agency relationship.
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and a portfolio manager (the agent). We have argued that, while this
peculiar form of agency relationship shares many features with a tra-
ditional principal-agent model, it also presents its own challenges. The
fact that in a delegated portfolio management setting the agent controls
eﬀort and can inﬂuence risk makes it more diﬃcult for the principal to
write incentive compatible contracts which are optimal from her stand-
point. In particular, we have shown how the fact that the portfolio
manager can control the scale of his response to the information signals
in a linear (and potentially also nonlinear) way makes the quest for an
optimal linear (and perhaps also nonlinear) contract for the principal
very diﬃcult. Indeed, this is a literature where negative results tend to
prevail over constructive ones.
We have also seen how reputation concerns in a multi-period set-
ting may aﬀect the incentives faced by portfolio managers and in some
cases make the job of explicit incentives. At the same time, reputation
concerns may also have distortionary eﬀects insofar as they may lead
managers to take on more risk or to discard private information and
herd with the market, none of which necessarily goes to the beneﬁto f
investors. Finally, the literature has emphasised that (implicit or ex-
plicit) benchmarking might have signiﬁcant implications for asset prices
and volatilities at a macro level.
Needless to say, there are several directions in which this literature
could be fruitfully extended. Delegated portfolio management often im-
plies more than one layer of agency, especially in the pension fund in-
dustry: how is this likely to aﬀect incentives and outcomes? Another
interesting extension appears to be considering less standard utility func-
tions for principals, say shortfall risk, which may be again particularly
relevant in the pension fund industry.19
More generally, gaining a better understanding of the general equi-
librium implications of the agency aspects of delegated portfolio man-
agement should be a paramount objective in future research. This is, in
particular, a topic which should be interesting and relevant for policy-
makers, given the importance of delegated portfolio management rela-
tionships in all developed ﬁnancial markets. Notably, the possible im-
pact of delegated portfolio management on the emergence of asset price
bubbles and on excessive trading in capital markets is an issue on which
the theoretical literature reviewed in this paper has deﬁnitely shed some
light and which would deserve further research.
Ideally, general equilibrium models of delegated portfolio manage-
ment should be able to determine the optimal compensation structure in
19I am grateful to a referee for this suggestion.
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Although there is no reason to think that developing such models will
be an easy task, since the literature has not been able to determine the
optimal structure of the compensation structure in a delegated portfo-
lio management context even in a partial equilibrium framework, our
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